PROLOGUE (2005)
The notes on Stochastic choice that follow were presented at a meeting held in San Sebastian in June of 1983 and organised by Salvador Barberà. It was research in progress that, alas, was never pursued. But it seems, by its subject, a most indicated contribution to a volume to honour Ket Richter. Obviously, I have the hope, but not the certainty, that something is still of interest in them. Or simply that there will be something to catch the sharp analytical eye of Ket. With my best regards to Ket, a model for us all of how theory should be done, here they go. I have corrected some obvious inaccuracies and, occasionally, tightened some looseness of language.
I have also added some references (in particular, Falmagne,1978 , Fishburn,1998 , Barberà and Pattanaik,1986 , McFadden and Richter,1991 , McFadden,2004 , are very relevant to the subject matter of these notes) and taken into account the remarks of a referee(whom I thank).
Otherwise the text is as in 1983.
I. A General Formalism
A very general setting for the stochastic choice problem can be described thus (see also Manski, 1977) . There is given as data:
(1) A set of alternatives X . It is convenient to think of X as finite. where for every alternative x we are given the probability that x is chosen for some budget, etc.
Denote by the set of linear orders on P X .
Every probability measure µ on induces a probability measure
That is to say, is the measure generated on µ v Y by the choice vectors induced by preferences.
We then have two problems:
Rationalizability problem: A stochastic choice situation (described by (1)-(4) above) can be rationalized if there is a probability measure µ on P such that
Which conditions must the data of the problem satisfy in order for a rationalization to exist? there is an admissible statistic which is the probability that 0 is not selected in B . In other words, the data of the problem is an array p ( B ), B ∈ B , to be interpreted as asserting that given B the probability that 0 be the preferred element is . We always put ( )
then the data of the problem will never be able to distinguish between and f f′ . Therefore, the rationalizability and, above all, the recoverability problem should properly be posed with respect to * P = ≈ P . Note that for the elements of transitivity requirement has no strength. Avoiding the transitivity issue is the main advantage of analyzing the particular case of a distinguished alternative.
I briefly discuss three subcases that differ by the nature of the admissible . Take X finite, with # 1
The rationalization problem for this subcase has been extensively treated and is completely solved. See Falmagne, 1978 , Barberà and Pattanaik, 1986 , Cohen and Falmagne, 1990 , Barberà, 1991 Every preference in * P can be identified with a set B ∈ B , i.e. B
is the set of alternatives at least as good as 0. Then a probability on * P can be identified with a list
. Therefore, p ( ) can be rationalized if and only if the following recursion process (see Barberà and Pattanaik, 1986 )yields a probability measure. Put first.
has been computed for any C up to size m .
Put then
Obviously, this recursion process gives us a complete list 
This is in a sense the polar opposite to subcase (a). Here we only have the outcome of the pairwise matching of 0 against every .
We write .
It is obvious that in this subcase, where there is much less information than in (a), any p ( ) can be rationalized. Indeed, any ). Therefore, the entire
The counterpart to the above pleasant fact is that the preference distribution cannot be recovered. This is clear counting equations and unknowns , one for every ( )
-Rationalizability with convex preferences
With 0 a distinguished alternative in X we are given, for every , a number
which is interpreted as the probability of x winning over 0. We have seen (subcase (b) in II)
that p can always be rationalized by a distribution µ on P . In applications, however, it may be important that µ give positive weight only to preferences satisfying some restrictions. 
It is no longer true that any p ( . ) can be rationalized by a µ π is a probability measure concentrated on we have . Suppose now that of the proposition would be π ′ in this example, namely, it is the one that maximizes the probability that 0 be the overall maximin, i.e.
( ) φ π . The construction of the proof seems to indicate that this maximizing probability measure is unique.
[ . 
Given a probability measure µ on a probability choice function is generated as follows:
where the second equality applies only if has a density . From now on we shall assume that all f µ we deal with have densities which, moreover, are sufficiently nice (say of class and equal to zero outside of a compact set, or, at least, "rapidly decreasing"). . See the figure. p ( See Shepp and Kruskal (1978), Helgason, (1980) , or Dym and McKean (1972) 
